Issued by the Berom Educational and Cultural Organisation (BECO)
Following the Judgment in Suit No: PLD/J215/202, Fatima Baba Akawu & Anor v. Jos North Local Government Council (Delivered 9 June 2026)
PREAMBLE: A Judgment That Proves Our Point
On 9 June 2026, Honourable Justice C. Donglong of the Plateau State High Court delivered a judgment directing Jos North Local Government Council to issue a Certificate of Indigene to one Fatima Baba Akawu, a Hausa woman, on the grounds that her father, Baba Alhaji Akawu, was himself an indigene of Jos North who had represented the constituency in the National Assembly in 1983.
We at BECO have read this judgment carefully We do not dispute its legal reasoning as a matter of positive law. The court applied Section 25 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s decision in Anzaku v. Governor of Nasarawa State (2013). The Defendant Local Government Council did not appear to defend the case. On these narrow procedural and constitutional grounds, the judgment is what it is.
But law is not justice. And a judgment is not widom
What concerns BECO, and what we now place before the Nigerian public, is not the technical correctness of Justice Donglong’s ruling. It is the selective, hypocritical, and politically motivated deployment of this judgment by HausaFulani irredentists who would never, for a single moment, accept its logic when applied to their own domains.
The question we pose to Sani Ibn Salihu and his co-travellers is simple and unavoidable:
If this judgment is correct for Plateau State, why is it not being celebrated in Kano State? If Fatima Akawu is entitled to indigeneity in Jos North because her father was born there, why is the daughter of an Igbo man born in Fagge LGA in 1955 not entitled to indigeneity in Kano State?
The silence from the Hausa-Fulani establishment is deafening. And that silence is the most eloquent confession of bad faith.
PART ONE: The Curious Geography of Constitutional Enthusiasm
Let us begin with a factual observation that Salihu cannot dispute.
Since the judgment was delivered on 9 June 2026, BECO has monitored public commentary, social media discourse, and legal analysis across Nigeria. What we have found is revealing:
Region Reaction to the Akawu Judgment
Plateau StateCelebrated as a victory for constitutionalism and human rights by the Hausa-Fulani advocates
Kano State (official and unofficial circles)Complete silence
Kaduna StateCautious endorsement for Plateau Hausa-Fulani; but no equivalent demand for Kano
Lagos State (Hausa-Fulani commentators)Supportive of the judgment’s logic, but strictly for the case of Plateau only
South-East (Igbo commentators)Asking the same question BECO is asking: what about us in Kano?
South-South Baffled by the selective application of constitutional principles
The pattern is unmistakable. The Hausa-Fulani political class has discovered constitutional anti-discrimination provisions only when those provisions benefit Hausa-Fulani claimants in minority territories. In their own majority-dominated states, these same provisions are ignored, circumvented, or actively suppressed.
This is not a legal argument. It is a political project. And it is time to name it as such.
PART TWO: The Irredentist Project—What Is Really at Stake
Sani Ibn Salihu’s original essay framed the indigeneity debate as a matter of historical accuracy and constitutional fidelity. The Akawu judgment, he would argue, vindicates his position: long-term residency and birth confer indigeneity, and ethnic origin cannot be used to deny certificates.
But this framing deliberately obscures the demographic and political stakes of the debate.
Let us state clearly what BECO believes is actually happening:
The Gradual Extinction of Plateau Minorities
The Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta are not large ethnic groups. According to various estimates:
•Berom: Approximately 1.5 million across Plateau State and diaspora
•Afizere (Jarawa): Approximately 300,000
•Anaguta: Approximately 100,000
These are small populations relative to the Hausa-Fulani demographic mass, which numbers over 70 million nationwide. A sustained campaign of “indigeneity through birth” in Plateau State, if applied consistently over two generations, would numerically overwhelm the autochthonous minorities.
Consider the mathematics:
If every Hausa child born in Jos North to Hausa parents (who themselves were born in Jos North) is classified as an “indigene” of Jos North, then within 50 years, the distinction between “autochthonous Berom” and “Hausa indigene” disappears entirely. The Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta become demographic fossils in their own homeland, outnumbered, outvoted, and eventually erased as distinct political and cultural entities.
This is not paranoia. This is demographic arithmetic.
The Question Salihu Cannot Answer
If indigeneity follows birth and descent, as the Akawu judgment affirms, then what prevents the entire Hausa-Fulani population of northern Nigeria from migrating to Plateau State, settling in Jos North, having children, and within two generations claiming indigeneity on the exact same legal basis?
Nothing. Absolutely nothing.
And that is precisely the point. The legal framework that Salihu champions, where indigeneity is detached from autochthony and attached instead to birth and parental origin, is a one-way ratchet. It benefits the larger, more mobile Hausa-Fulani population at the expense of smaller, geographically anchored minorities.
The same cannot be said in reverse. A Berom family that moves to Kano State and has children there will never be recognized as “indigenous” to Kano, no matter how many generations pass. The Kano State indigeneity framework is based on ethnic origin, not birth. The Berom remain “settlers” in perpetuity.
This is the asymmetry that Salihu refuses to acknowledge.
PART THREE: The Irony of the Akawu Judgment—Why Only Plateau?
Let us now examine the Akawu judgment itself through the lens of nationwide consistency.
Justice Donglong’s reasoning rests on three pillars:
1.Section 25(1)(a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution, which defines citizenship by birth based on birth and parental origin
2.The Supreme Court’s decision in Anzaku v. Governor of Nasarawa State (2013), which held that constitutional citizenship provisions guide indigeneity determination
3.The absence of any defence from Jos North Local Government Council
On these bases, the court held that Fatima Akawu, born in Jos North to a father who was himself born in Jos North and had previously been issued an indigeneity certificate, is entitled to recognition as an indigene of Jos North, notwithstanding her Hausa ethnic origin.
Let us accept this reasoning for the purpose of argument.
Now apply it to Fagge Local Government Area of Kano State.
The Hypothetical Case of Chukwudi Okonkwo
Imagine a man named Chukwudi Okonkwo. He is Igbo. His father, Chief Emmanuel Okonkwo, was born in Fagge LGA, Kano State, in 1955 to Igbo parents who had migrated from Anambra State in the 1940s for the groundnut trade. Chief Emmanuel Okonkwo was issued a Certificate of Indigene of Fagge LGA in 1984. In 1983, he was elected to the House of Representatives representing Fagge constituency. His son, Chukwudi, was born in Fagge LGA in 2000 and has lived there his entire life.
Chukwudi applies to Fagge LGA for a Certificate of Indigene. The Council denies him, stating that he is “Igbo” and therefore not indigenous to Kano State.
Does the Akawu judgment not compel Fagge LGA to issue Chukwudi an indigeneity certificate?
The legal reasoning is identical. Section 25 is the same. Anzaku is the same Supreme Court authority. The only difference is geography and ethnicity.
So why has no Hausa-Fulani commentator (including Sani Ibn Salihu) demanded that Fagge LGA be sued to compel the same outcome?
We await the answer. We will wait a long time.
PART FOUR: The “Residential Certificate” Hypocrisy
The Akawu judgment also declared that the “Residential Certificate” issued to Fatima Akawu, instead of an Indigene Certificate, is “an invalid instrument not recognized under any Nigerian law,” “void ab initio,” and has “no legal basis or effect whatsoever.”
BECO agrees with this finding as a matter of law. But again, we ask:
Why is this same reasoning not applied to Kano State’s treatment of non-Hausa residents?
In Kano State, Igbo, Yoruba, Tiv, Berom, and other “non-indigenes” are routinely issued documents that are functionally identical to Jos North’s Residential Certificate. These documents grant residency status but explicitly deny indigeneity. They are accepted by Kano State authorities as valid for the purpose of excluding non-Hausa residents from employment, scholarships, and political participation.
If the Residential Certificate is “void ab initio” in Jos North, it is equally void in Fagge, Kumbotso, Nassarawa, and Tarauni LGAs of Kano State.
Where is Salihu’s demand that the Kano State Government cease issuing these discriminatory documents? Where is his Originating Summons against Fagge LGA? Where is his reliance on Section 42 and Anzaku when the victims are Igbo and Berom?
There is none. There will be none. Because this was never about constitutional principle. It was always about Hausa-Fulani expansion.
PART FIVE: The Minority Extinction Thesis—Evidence and Pattern
BECO is not making abstract claims about demographic anxiety. There is a documented pattern across northern Nigeria of Hausa-Fulani demographic expansion at the expense of minority groups, facilitated by:
1.Gerrymandering (as in Jos North LGA in 1991)
2.Indigeneity redefinition (as argued by Salihu and now seemingly endorsed by the Akawu judgment)
3.Violent displacement (as documented in the Berom in Diaspora Coalition’s press conference of 13 November 2025)
4.Administrative manipulation (as seen in the “closed” indigeneity form that BECO defended, which the Akawu judgment now undermines)
The Numbers Tell the Story
According to the Berom in Diaspora Coalition and BECO’s joint press conference:
•Over 10,000 Berom people killed in ongoing attacks
•151 Berom communities displaced
•Vast lands forcefully occupied (by whom? The answer is not in doubt)
These are not historical grievances. These are ongoing realities. And they provide the material context for the legal arguments Salihu advances.
When a population is being systematically displaced and killed, legal arguments about “constitutional rights to indigeneity” for members of the group doing the displacing are not neutral legal scholarship. They are briefs for the continuation of dispossession.
We say this bluntly because the situation demands bluntness. You cannot kill Berom people, occupy Berom land, and then come to court demanding that your children be recognized as “indigenes” of that same land. That is not constitutionalism. That is colonialism by other means.
PART SIX: The Anzaku Case—What Salihu Does Not Tell You
Salihu relies heavily on Anzaku v. Governor of Nasarawa State (2013). But he omits the context that makes that case fundamentally different from the Jos North situation.
Anzaku involved a dispute within Tiv communities in Nasarawa State. The question was whether a particular Tiv clan was “indigenous” to a particular local government area. The Supreme Court held that constitutional citizenship provisions guide indigeneity determination.
But critically:
•Anzaku did not involve a non-autochthonous population claiming indigeneity against autochthonous minorities.
•Anzaku did not involve a demographic mass of over 70 million people claiming indigeneity against small populations of less than 2 million.
•Anzaku did not involve a history of violent displacement, land grabbing, and gerrymandering by the claiming group.
The Supreme Court was not asked to decide whether Hausa traders who arrived in 1905 are “indigenous” in the same sense as Berom clans who have occupied the Plateau since before the Sokoto Caliphate existed. The Court was not asked to determine whether a legal framework that benefits the largest ethnic group in Nigeria at the expense of the smallest is consistent with the Constitution’s promise of “national integration.”
To invoke Anzaku without acknowledging these distinctions is intellectual dishonesty.
PART SEVEN: The Question of Reciprocity—Why BECO Will Not Accept Unilateral Disarmament
At the conclusion of BECO’s initial response to Salihu, we stated our position clearly:
If Salihu wants Plateau State to open its political doors to Hausa-Fulani “indigenes,” he must first open his mouth to demand the same for Berom “residents” in Kano, for Igbo “residents” in Lagos, and for every other Nigerian who has been told that their birthplace is not their home.
The Akawu judgment does not change this position. It strengthens it.
Because now we have a binding judicial precedent in Plateau State that indigeneity follows birth and parental origin, not ethnic origin. That precedent applies equally to every local government area in Nigeria, including every LGA in Kano State.
We challenge Sani Ibn Salihu to do one of two things:
Option A: Consistent Constitutionalism
Publicly demand that the Kano State Government and all LGAs in Kano State immediately adopt the exact same indigeneity standard that the Akawu judgment applies to Jos North. This means:
•Issuing Certificates of Indigene to every person born in Kano State to parents who were themselves born in Kano State, regardless of ethnic origin
•Abolishing all “Residential Certificates” or equivalent discriminatory documents in Kano State
•Recognizing Igbo, Yoruba, Berom, Tiv, and all other non-Hausa-Fulani residents of Kano as “indigenes” on the same terms as Hausa-Fulani residents
If Salihu does this publicly, and if he campaigns for this outcome in Kano with the same energy he has devoted to Plateau, then BECO will acknowledge his consistency. We may still disagree with his position, but we will respect his intellectual integrity.
Option B: Confessed Hypocrisy
Continue to celebrate the Akawu judgment for Plateau State while remaining silent about its implications for Kano State, Fagge LGA, and every other Hausa-Fulani-dominated jurisdiction that systematically excludes non-Hausa “indigenes” from political participation.
If Salihu chooses this option, and we suspect he will, then his silence is his confession. And BECO will continue to name his project for what it is: Hausa-Fulani irredentism dressed in constitutional robes.
PART EIGHT: The Lagos Test Case
We raised the example of Lagos State in our initial response. The Akawu judgment provides an even sharper test.
Consider the following:
FactJos North (Akawu case)Lagos State (hypothetical)
Father born in LGA/State in 1955Yes (Baba Alhaji Akawu)Yes (hypothetical Igbo father)
Father issued Indigene Certificate in 1984YesUnder Akawu logic, must be yes
Father represented LGA in National AssemblyYesPossible (hypothetical)
Child born in LGA/State in 2000Yes (Fatima Akawu)Yes (hypothetical Igbo child)
Child applies for Indigene CertificateYesYes
LGA/State denies based on ethnic originYes (Hausa denied by Jos North)Yes (Igbo denied by Lagos)
Under the Akawu reasoning, the hypothetical Igbo child in Lagos is equally entitled to a Certificate of Indigene from Lagos State. The same Section 25. The same Anzaku. The same logic.
Will any Hausa-Fulani commentator defend that outcome?
We have asked this question publicly. We have received no answer. We will continue to ask it.
PART NINE: The Meaning of “Minority Extinction” in the Nigerian Context
Let us be precise about what BECO means by “extinction” in this context. We do not mean physical extermination, though violence has certainly occurred. We mean political, demographic, and cultural extinction, the process by which a distinct people loses:
1.Political representation (through gerrymandering and demographic swamping)
2.Land and resource control (through displacement and legal redefinition of indigeneity)
3.Cultural distinctiveness (through assimilation into a larger group’s identity)
4.Historical memory (through the erasure of autochthonous claims in favor of “birthplace” narratives)
The Akawu judgment, if applied consistently across Nigeria, would accelerate this extinction for every minority group in the country, not just Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta, but also Ijaw, Ogoni, Tiv, Efik, Ibibio, and dozens of others.
Because the logic is simple: the largest ethnic groups have the greatest demographic capacity to “seed” children across the country who will then claim indigeneity by birth.
The Hausa-Fulani (over 70 million) can send 1 million migrants to Jos North. Those migrants have children. Those children, under the Akawu logic, are indigenes. Within two generations, the Berom are a minority in their own homeland.
The Igbo (over 40 million) could do the same in Lagos, but they are prevented by Yoruba nativism. The Yoruba (over 40 million) could do the same in Abuja, but they are prevented by the government control of the federal territory.
The only groups that benefit from “indigeneity by birth” are the groups large enough to project demographic power across state boundaries. That is the Hausa-Fulani. And that is the entire point.
PART TEN: The Legal Strategy Behind the Akawu Case
BECO has studied the Akawu case file carefully. We note several features that suggest a coordinated legal strategy rather than an isolated claim:
1.The Defendant (Jos North LGA) did not appear. In a matter of such political sensitivity, is it plausible that the Local Government Council simply “forgot” to defend itself? Or was there coordination to allow a default judgment that would then become precedent?
2.The 2nd Claimant, Baba Alhaji Akawu, was a former Member of the House of Representatives. This is not a poor, marginalized applicant. This is a well-connected political figure with resources and legal advice.
3.The judgment was delivered on 9 June 2026, remarkably quickly given the complexity of the constitutional questions involved.
4.The reliefs sought were carefully crafted to mirror the language of Section 42 and Anzaku, making it difficult for any subsequent court to distinguish the case on its facts.
We do not allege impropriety. The court did its duty based on the materials before it. But we do observe that this case bears all the hallmarks of strategic litigation designed to establish a precedent that Hausa-Fulani irredentists can then deploy across the Middle Belt.
Sani Ibn Salihu knows this. He may even have been involved in planning it. The question is whether the Nigerian public will see the strategy for what it is.
CONCLUSION: The Burden of Consistency Has Not Been Met
The Akawu judgment changes the legal landscape in Plateau State. BECO acknowledges that reality. But a judgment is not a moral victory. And legal precedent is not political wisdom.
We repeat the challenge we issued in our initial response, now strengthened by the Akawu precedent:
Where is Salihu’s essay on Fagge LGA?
Where is his condemnation of the Oba of Lagos?
Where is his demand for indigeneity certification for Igbo residents of Kano?
Where is his Originating Summons against any Hausa-Fulani-dominated LGA that denies indigeneity to non-Hausa residents?
Until these are produced, until the same constitutional fervour applied to Jos North is applied to Kano, Lagos, and every other state, BECO will not accept that the Akawu judgment represents anything other than selective justice for a selective community.
The Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta have survived on the Plateau for millennia. We survived the Sokoto Caliphate’s slave raids. We survived colonial tin mining that destroyed our sacred shrines. We survived the gerrymandering of 1991. We survived the violence of 2001, 2008, and 2010. We have buried over 10,000 of our people.
We will survive this legal assault as well. Not by matching violence with violence, but by insisting on a simple, unanswerable question:
Why should Plateau State unilaterally adopt a definition of indigeneity that benefits Hausa-Fulani expansion, when Hausa-Fulani states refuse to adopt that same definition when it would benefit minorities?
Until that question is answered honestly, the Akawu judgment is not a legal victory for constitutionalism. It is a political weapon in a demographic war. And BECO will continue to name it as such.
Issued by the Berom Educational and Cultural Organisation (BECO) 13 June 2026